Image courtesy of Shealah Craighead/The While House/Flickr
This article was originally published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on 20 August 2018.
In July 2018, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action convened a workshop to examine areas of cooperation between the United States and the European Union. The workshop was made possible by the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The views described here are those of the workshop participants only and are not CFR or Carnegie Corporation positions. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government.
This article was originally published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) on 7 June 2018.
Angela Merkel finally responds to Emmanuel Macron’s Europe reform plans – but through the pages of a newspaper, and in only the most guarded of terms.
This article was originally published by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) on 24 April 2018.
What expectations should the EU harbour with respect to Britain’s continued contribution to EU defence activities after Brexit and can the former member state expect special treatment?
With Brexit, the UK will become a ‘third state’ vis-à-vis the European Union. In the defence domain, this means that the UK will no longer take part in EU decision-making or operational (planning) bodies, will not command or be the framework nation of an EU-led force, and any British contribution to an EU operation will be subject to the rules that apply to third countries.
This article was originally published by the German Instiitute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in April 2018.
European attitudes towards China and its Belt and Road Initiative are changing. While the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping is the only country in the world pursuing a global vision, distrust of China’s expanding influence is growing. As a consequence, the European debate about China is becoming increasingly emotional with interpretations fluctuating between alarmism and reassurance. Ideas about the ‘essence of China’ and expectations that the country should fit into the liberal order according to Western standards, however, threaten to limit Europe’s scope of action in dealing with the People’s Republic. In order to develop strategies for a confident German and European policy, China’s current global political approach should be considered systematically. Based on the features of China’s ‘connectivity politics’ (Konnektivitätspolitik), Germany and the EU could formulate policy options that go far beyond the realm of infrastructure.