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This graphic provides the reader with a helpful guide to navigating the different institutions and initiatives involved in the debate surrounding the possibility of creating a European Army. For an in-depth analysis of how Brexit could affect European defense, see Dan Keohane’s chapter in Strategic Trends 2017 here. For more CSS charts and graphics, click here.
This article was originally published by War on the Rocks on 14 February 2019.
In a recent speech in Hungary, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Europeans that using technology from Chinese telecommunications manufacturer Huawei could hurt their relationship with the United States. This warning follows a series of high-profile arm wrestling involving the U.S. government, Huawei, and countries like Canada and Australia. The Huawei saga has come to encapsulate a broader concern: Current efforts by Chinese state-led companies to access — and eventually dominate — global markets in key technologies, such as 5G or artificial intelligence, raise a number of privacy and competition-related questions. China’s disinterest in Western standards, coupled with lack of reciprocity and other barriers to foreign companies operating in the Chinese market, makes these challenges even more acute. As argued by other U.S. officials, the lack of a level playing field ultimately means that China could leverage global supply chains and infrastructure nodes and “game” the current international order against American power. In order to forestall this risk, the United States will need to work with allies. And the advanced economies of Western Europe and East Asia are particularly critical.
Image courtesy of Markus Spiske/pexels
This article was originally published by the Norwegian institute of International Affairs (NUPI) on 29 January 2019.
This Policy Brief provides an overview of the military cyber-defence strategies and capabilities of Norway and of the Netherlands. Comparison of the two different approaches offers insights into their differing tactics and future policy directions. The Brief contributes with a small-state perspective on this malleable and constantly changing field, nuancing the hitherto US-centred debate on the utility and need for deterrence and defence in cyberspace.
This article was originally published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in January 2019.
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project was late in coming to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). First announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, OBOR, later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), did not arrive in the LAC until 2018, when, at a meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin America and the Caribbean) Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed that BRI would “inject new energy into the China-CELAC comprehensive cooperative partnership and open up new prospects.” Given the impressive rise of the People’s Republic of China to the world’s second largest economy—first, by some measures—and the difficulties that many LAC countries were experiencing, it is hardly surprising that Wang’s offer was greeted with enthusiasm. If brought to completion, the integration of the LAC region into BRI would comprise 65 percent of the world’s population and 40 percent of global GDP.
This graphic shows how the USSR compared to the US in terms of population, real GDP per capita (USD), defense spending (in billion USD) and nuclear weapons in the 1980s, as well as how the US compares to Russia in these key areas today. For an analysis of how different interpretations of the recent past still affect West-Russia relations and what is needed to rebuild trust, see Christian Nünlist’s chapter in Strategic Trends 2017 here. For more CSS charts and graphics, click here.