Illustration: Berkay Bugdan, ‘Iran Nuclear Program’. Charcoal and digital 2006. berkaybugdan.com
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are exclusively the author’s and do not necessarily represent the position of the Center for Security Studies or of any other institution.
In the conflict over its nuclear program, Iran was subjected to one of the toughest and most sophisticated sanctions regimes ever seen. Yet sanctions alone did not give rise to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The nuclear agreement resulted from an intricate interplay between sanctions and conflict context. This successful resolution of the nuclear issue can be attributed to two factors. First, masterful diplomacy on both sides isolated the issue of the nuclear program from the wider conflict between the Islamic Republic and the West and circumnavigated some of its intractable trials and tribulations. Second, the agreement was reached in the face of the constant machinations of hardliners on both sides, whose precise objective it was to link the nuclear issue to the wider struggle between the Islamic Republic and the West.
Courtesy Kenny Cole/Flickr
This article was originally published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist on 3 November 2016.
France has a deep and abiding relationship with nuclear technology. French policy-makers have based France’s energy and military independence around nuclear programs. However, as the French government attempts to justify its budget policies in the lead-up to the presidential election in April 2017, calls for a public debate on the cost of military nuclear deterrence are increasing.
This debate encompasses three main questions. Should France still base its global defence strategy on nuclear deterrence? If yes, how should nuclear deterrence be conducted? Finally, how should the state efficiently budget for this strategic investment?
Questions about the future of the nuclear program come from the growing cost of France’s nuclear deterrent. France’s nuclear arsenal is currently fully operational but will soon require a complete modernisation. Within the next 30 years, French forces will need new submarines, aircraft and missiles. To achieve this, France’s current military nuclear expenditure of €3.4 billion a year, which equals 10% of the French Ministry of Defence’s total budget, will need a significant increase. By 2025, nuclear deterrence will cost French taxpayers an estimated €6 billion a year or more. Where will future French governments find €120 billion over 20 years?
Courtesy Gilad Rom/Flickr
This article was originally published by the Council on Foreign Relations on 7 October 2016.
A decade has passed since North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon, on October 9, 2006. It conducted its fifth nuclear test last September, and there are rumors that a sixth will come within weeks or months. The United States has tried to both negotiate with and sanction North Korea while strengthening deterrence with South Korea and conducting shows of force to underscore the U.S. commitment to South Korean defense, but these measures have not halted, much less reversed, North Korea’s nuclear program.
Instead, following the leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, North Korea has elevated its nuclear program to a primary strategic commitment, reigniting debates among U.S. experts over whether the U.S. goal of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” is feasible. North Korea has conducted four tests during the Obama administration, and the president reiterated after the latest one that the United States “does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state.” Yet the longer that North Korea is able to expand its nuclear delivery capability, the more empty U.S. condemnations may become and the closer North Korea will edge toward winning de facto acceptance of its nuclear status.
President of Iran addresses UNGA. Photo: United Nations Photo/flickr.
Despite eight months of negotiations with the E3+3, Iran remains committed to its highly-controversial nuclear program. Talks over the past year followed a similar pattern to previous discussions, with the E3+3 failing in its attempts to establish the true nature of Tehran’s ambitions. Negotiations were also conducted against the backdrop of growing political unrest across the Middle East and the prospect of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Yet despite continued frustration and the growing threat of conflict, 2013 might turn out to be the year in which negotiations take a turn for the better.
In terms of improving dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran appears determined to pick up where it left off in December 2012. Despite failing to agree upon a framework for the future inspection of Iranian nuclear facilities, both sides will resume talks on February 12th. Back in August, the IAEA also reported that Iran’s stockpile of 20% enriched uranium had remained unchanged since May, when Tehran converted supplies for medical purposes.
Another source of inspiration may come from the re-election of Barack Obama. In remarks made shortly after his victory, the U.S. President reiterated the importance of negotiating with Iran. Along with promises to push for the resumption of direct dialogue with Tehran, Obama also openly suggested that Iran might be able to maintain a low-scale nuclear program on condition that it provides credible evidence that it is being used for peaceful purposes. » More