This article was originally published by the East-West Center on 27 February 2017.
The recent story of Australian defense policy is straightforward. Faced with an increasingly adverse strategic outlook, Australia has been bolstering its defenses since the turn of the century. In the past 15 years defense spending has increased by 75% in real terms, defense personnel numbers are up by 18%, and military modernization is underway across the board. At the same me, Australia has demonstrated its alliance credentials through stalwart support of US‐led operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. As a result, there is little doubt that the Australian Defense Force (ADF) is now more capable and more inter‐operable with the US, and the Australia‐US alliance is stronger than at any time since at least the Vietnam conflict.
But the strategic environment has continued to deteriorate on multiple fronts. Most alarming has been China’s annexation and militarization of contested territory in the South China Sea. It is hardly surprising then, that Australia unveiled plans last year to further expand and modernize its own defense force. Just about every aspect of the ADF is slated for expansion and/or enhancement over the next two decades, but the centerpiece is a US$50 billion naval construction program. In addition to new classes of anti‐submarine frigates and offshore patrol vessels, 12 new French‐designed submarines — much larger than any extant conventional submarines — will replace the six existing boats. To pay for this large‐scale program, the government has promised to increase defense spending to 2.1% of the GDP by 2020.
This article was originally published by Carnegie Europe on 16 December 2016.
Explaining EU defense policy is not easy. But poor communication by the Brussels-based institutions plays into the hands of Euroskeptics and can damage public trust in union policies. In particular, there is no more misleading or damaging phrase than “European army.”
Federalist politicians, like European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, often declare their support for this idea. But like Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, they will wait for an eternity before an EU army becomes a reality.
There can be no European army without a European state. And a federal superstate is not in the cards. Those who propose a Euro-army may think that they are furthering their federalist fantasies, but it is not a credible solution to today’s security challenges. If anything, it is easily perceived as either an evil plot or a useless distraction—or both.
This article was originally published by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on 1 December 2016.
President-elect Trump’s book The Art of the Deal applies the principles of negotiation to business, but they are universal to human nature. A century ago, a previous president indicated similar sentiment when Theodore Roosevelt wrote “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Latent power fuels deals. Upon entering the highest office in the land, President-elect Trump will engage in entirely new types of negotiations. And in this new venue, military power is the new trump card.
U.S. military strength gives the United States leverage in the global arena.
Military power is not organic or constant. It requires investment, innovation, and maintenance. Deploying military power degrades it and requires later revitalization. Adversaries adapt to the most advanced equipment and effective tactics. New threats emerge while old ones wane. Military leverage stems from warfighting advantage, which encompasses two simultaneous requirements: the ability to project military power abroad and to protect the U.S. homeland.
This article was originally published by the Foreign Policy Research institute (FPRI) on 21 November 2016.
President-elect Donald Trump is in the midst of selecting his national security team. He not only needs to decide the “who,” but also the “how” of national security decision-making. It is unclear whether he will adopt Ronald Reagan’s model of entrusting empowered Cabinet secretaries to handle such matters; follow in Richard Nixon’s footsteps of retaining close control over foreign policy within the White House through the National Security Advisor; or emulate George H.W. Bush’s hybrid “gang” blending both White House staff and senior officials.
Beyond his staffing choices, the president-elect and his counselors must also be prepared to tackle a series of questions about U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy, both to inform his continuing selection of personnel to serve in his administration and to shape his conversations with foreign leaders who are anxious to take the temperature of the new Chief Executive. In addition, his answers will be critical if he wants to link his campaign promises with actual policies.
Courtesy Tilemahos Efthimiadis/Flickr. CC BY 2.0
This article was originally published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) on 14 November 2016.
EU Member States are unlikely to reach consensus on comprehensive reform of Common Security and Defence Policy soon. What may follow will be attempts to establish a European “defence core.” That, however, would threaten NATO adaptation to the new security challenges and undermine the coherence of the EU itself. It is Poland’s interest to avoid such a scenario in favour of inclusiveness in defence cooperation in the EU. The country should also seek to confirm a balanced approach to European defence industry policy.
The future of defence cooperation within the European Union returned to the political agenda in Europe with implementation of the European Global Strategy (EGS), which aims to reinforce Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). At the same time, some Member States have proposed the establishment of a European “defence core.” Since it is unlikely that the EU will agree on comprehensive reform of CSDP within the EGS implementation, the Member States that call for a rapid deepening of defence integration in Europe will try to pursue their agenda in an exclusive grouping. These states argue that such a step is a proper political reaction to the EU and Brexit crises, as well as the correct operational answer to the security crisis in the Union’s southern neighbourhood. But in this scenario, Poland and other likeminded EU countries that support a pragmatic vision of CSDP and seek added-value through EU-developed military capabilities may be forced out of the main vehicle of defence cooperation in Europe.