The Logic of China’s North Korea Policy

DPRK: train from Pyongyang to Dandong
Train from Pyongyang to Dandong. Photo: kwramm/flickr.

US and South Korean analysts are annoyed and frustrated by China’s policy toward North Korea. In their eyes, Beijing’s policy not only jeopardizes the security of the US and the ROK and undermines international norms, but is detrimental to China’s own national interests as well. But judgments about whether China’s North Korea policy is illogical or self-defeating depend very much on what people see as China’s goals. Most Chinese analysts would argue that China’s policy has its own internal logic; whether the US and South Korea see that logic is a different matter.

The widely accepted assumption is that China has three goals when it comes to North Korea: stability (no implosion and no war), peace (diplomatic normalization between the US and North Korea), and denuclearization/nonproliferation. Among these three, China prioritizes stability over peace and denuclearization. The secondary status of denuclearization is a sore spot for Washington and Seoul, which see it as the most important goal (or should be). And while different priorities lead to different approaches, North Korean actions have been destabilizing. Therefore, China’s strategy is counterproductive in terms of its own priority, hence illogical.

China’s Afghan Game Plan

The game of Weiqi
The game of Weiqi. Photo: fabiocosta0305/flickr.

MADRID – In his latest book, On China, Henry Kissinger uses the traditional intellectual games favored by China and the West – weiqi and chess – as a way to reveal their differing attitudes toward international power politics. Chess is about total victory, a Clausewitzian battle for the “center of gravity” and the eventual elimination of the enemy, whereas weiqi is a quest for relative advantage through a strategy of encirclement that avoids direct conflict.

This cultural contrast is a useful guide to the way that China manages its current competition with the West. China’s Afghan policy is a case in point, but it also is a formidable challenge to the weiqi way. As the United States prepares to withdraw its troops from the country, China must deal with an uncertain post-war scenario.

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Global Voices

China: Sparking the ‘Exile is Not Freedom’ Debate

On 27 April, 2012 blind Chinese lawyer and activist, Chen Guangcheng, escaped from a remote village surrounded by security forces in the middle of the night. International media widely covered the story, and the events turned out to be a diplomatic headache for both the Chinese and American governments, which were getting ready for their annual summit in Beijing.

Since Chen ran towards freedom, it made sense that he sought refuge at the American Embassy. While at the embassy, however, Chen made a surprising statement: he did not want to leave China, nor did he want asylum. If Chen was a headache for the US, so was the US for Chen.

 

“More Glorious than the Sun” by Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm for China Digital Times.

Chen Guangcheng: “Premier Wen, I have three requests!”
Uncle Sam: ”Wait, wait! Give me a promise!“
Wen Jiabao: ”Trust me! Fairness and justice are more glorious than the sun.“
‘More Glorious than the Sun’ by Hexie Farm’s Crazy Crab for China Digital Times.

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Global Voices

Chinese Investment: Boon or Bane for Southeast Asia?

Spontaneous protests against Myanmar’s power blackouts received news coverage in May because the government seldom permits anti-government activities. Even more significant were the protests that took place in front of the Chinese embassy in Yangon.

Protesters came together to raise their voice against the government’s decision to sell Myanmar’s limited energy reserves to China. Below is a comment from the Facebook page of Eleven Media Group [my], one of the largest private media organizations in Myanmar, which echoed the sentiment of many consumers in Myanmar:

“70% of electricity supplied to Yangon is from Law Pi Ta and Ye Ywar hydro-powered stations, that from the Shwe Li station goes to China, so there is a shortage of electricity in Yangon. Why? Go and cut China’s power!”

Protest against electricity shortages around City Hall, Yangon. Image from Facebook page of CJMyanmar.
Protest against electricity shortages around City Hall, Yangon. Image from Facebook page of CJMyanmar.

Mongolia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Ulan Bator - Bejing
Ulan Bator - Bejing. Photo: Dave Gray/flickr.

Given Mongolia’s potential to become a future commodity powerhouse, it does not seem strange that recent legislation that aims to cap foreign investment and ownership was a cause for concern among the domestic and global business community. The Strategic Foreign Investment Law  aims to confront two major challenges to Mongolia’s social and economic development. Firstly, the regime has to respond to domestic demands that resource wealth is used to benefit the wider population.  Moreover, Mongolia also seeks to reduce its dependence on its two powerful neighbors and in particular to limit Chinese influence over its economy. Neither of these dilemmas will be easily resolved.

After intense domestic lobbying, the Mongolian Parliament approved a watered-down version of the Strategic Foreign Investment Law on 17 May. Initially, the law stipulated that foreign investors seeking to buy a stake of more than 49% in Mongolian companies required the approval of Mongolia’s Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (Fifta) and Parliament.  However, following amendments aimed at appeasing foreign investors, the conditions only apply to companies involved in Mongolia’s ‘strategically important’ mining, financial, and media and telecommunications sectors and when deals are valued at above $76 million. Yet deals in which the buyer company is even partially in state ownership will require approval regardless of the sector of the business.