This article was originally published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) on 1 March 2017.
The first EUISS Security Monthly Stats (SMS) brings together defence data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 2016. Aggregating figures from the 28 EU member states, the graphics answer a series of questions about defence spending levels and arms exports.
This article was originally published by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on 16 February 2017.
This week Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis delivered some tough love to America’s allies in Europe. Addressing NATO defense ministers, Mattis offered “clarity on the political reality in the United States.” If the allies do not want to see America moderate its commitment to them, he said, “each of your capitals needs to show its support for our common defense.”
On its face, Mattis’ call for NATO to spend more on defense is hardly new, and his words echo the public warnings given by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and others. This year, however, after President Trump’s repeated questioning of NATO’s value, the allies are listening especially closely. The new administration is right to call for a boost in European defense spending, but the right measure of our allies’ value is in fact much broader. An overweening focus on budget metrics risks distorting, to NATO’s detriment and to America’s, what it means to be a good military ally.
This article was originally published by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on 1 December 2016.
President-elect Trump’s book The Art of the Deal applies the principles of negotiation to business, but they are universal to human nature. A century ago, a previous president indicated similar sentiment when Theodore Roosevelt wrote “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Latent power fuels deals. Upon entering the highest office in the land, President-elect Trump will engage in entirely new types of negotiations. And in this new venue, military power is the new trump card.
U.S. military strength gives the United States leverage in the global arena.
Military power is not organic or constant. It requires investment, innovation, and maintenance. Deploying military power degrades it and requires later revitalization. Adversaries adapt to the most advanced equipment and effective tactics. New threats emerge while old ones wane. Military leverage stems from warfighting advantage, which encompasses two simultaneous requirements: the ability to project military power abroad and to protect the U.S. homeland.
This article was originally published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on 21 November 2016.
Today, SIPRI is launching its new extended military expenditure data—free to download from our website—with consistent data going back as far as 1949.
It may seem curious that, although SIPRI has published military expenditure data almost since its creation, starting with data from 1950 in the very first SIPRI Yearbook of 1969/70, for the past 20 years or so we have only been able to provide data going back to 1988. Varying methodologies meant that we could not guarantee consistency between data collected before 1988 and data collected after 1988, and so no meaningful comparisons between these data sets could be made. Until now.
Courtesy Kenny Cole/Flickr
This article was originally published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist on 3 November 2016.
France has a deep and abiding relationship with nuclear technology. French policy-makers have based France’s energy and military independence around nuclear programs. However, as the French government attempts to justify its budget policies in the lead-up to the presidential election in April 2017, calls for a public debate on the cost of military nuclear deterrence are increasing.
This debate encompasses three main questions. Should France still base its global defence strategy on nuclear deterrence? If yes, how should nuclear deterrence be conducted? Finally, how should the state efficiently budget for this strategic investment?
Questions about the future of the nuclear program come from the growing cost of France’s nuclear deterrent. France’s nuclear arsenal is currently fully operational but will soon require a complete modernisation. Within the next 30 years, French forces will need new submarines, aircraft and missiles. To achieve this, France’s current military nuclear expenditure of €3.4 billion a year, which equals 10% of the French Ministry of Defence’s total budget, will need a significant increase. By 2025, nuclear deterrence will cost French taxpayers an estimated €6 billion a year or more. Where will future French governments find €120 billion over 20 years?