The CSS Blog Network

Securing a Nuclear Energy Future

Satsop Nuclear Power Plant

Courtesy of Dave Sizer/Flickr. CC BY 2.0

This article was originally published by the Harvard International Review on 5 December 2016.

Since the atom was first split, the possibilities of war, terrorism, and proliferation have polluted the connotation of “nuclear,” driving public fear and associated dialogue surrounding the development of nuclear technology. In the last half of the twentieth century, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the modern geopolitical layout of the world, from alliances to modern conflicts. Nuclear capabilities became one of the greatest criteria to determine a country’s power and respect on the global stage.

In this year’s US presidential election, the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran was a divisive issue. The multinational agreement aims to prevent weapons development by fostering an officially recognized and heavily regulated nuclear energy program. This deal reflects a shift in the global nuclear narrative, from aggressive prevention efforts to diplomatic limitations. It further recognizes that as more states acquire nuclear development infrastructure, there will be more chances for materials to fall into the wrong hands. Preventing proliferation to terrorists, militant groups, and less amicable state actors is a global priority. Greater involvement and oversight from institutions like the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can facilitate better security standards for protecting nuclear materials.

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The Future of War in Space is Defensive: A Strong Offense isn’t Always the Right Answer

 Unknown Star Wars Character

Courtesy StephenMitchell/Flickr. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

This article was originally published by War is Boring on 24 November 2016.

The best defense is a good offense — or is it? The answer to this question, along with an understanding of the stronger form of warfare, is the single most important consideration in U.S. space strategy and funding major space programs.

Satellites and other spacecraft have always been vulnerable targets for America’s adversaries. Today, attacking U.S. on-orbit capabilities offers the potential to cripple U.S. conventional power projection and impose significant costs, whether in dollars, lives or political capital.

Many strategists and policymakers have concluded that because space-based systems are seen as exposed to attack — with little way to defend them — that the offense is the stronger form of warfare in space. This conclusion is incorrect and has led to an underdeveloped U.S. space strategy.

Time-tested theory and principles of war underscore that the defense is the stronger form of warfare in space.

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Defence Policy in the European Union: Multi-Speed Security?

Courtesy Tilemahos Efthimiadis/Flickr. CC BY 2.0

This article was originally published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) on 14 November 2016.

EU Member States are unlikely to reach consensus on comprehensive reform of Common Security and Defence Policy soon. What may follow will be attempts to establish a European “defence core.” That, however, would threaten NATO adaptation to the new security challenges and undermine the coherence of the EU itself. It is Poland’s interest to avoid such a scenario in favour of inclusiveness in defence cooperation in the EU. The country should also seek to confirm a balanced approach to European defence industry policy.

The future of defence cooperation within the European Union returned to the political agenda in Europe with implementation of the European Global Strategy (EGS), which aims to reinforce Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). At the same time, some Member States have proposed the establishment of a European “defence core.” Since it is unlikely that the EU will agree on comprehensive reform of CSDP within the EGS implementation, the Member States that call for a rapid deepening of defence integration in Europe will try to pursue their agenda in an exclusive grouping. These states argue that such a step is a proper political reaction to the EU and Brexit crises, as well as the correct operational answer to the security crisis in the Union’s southern neighbourhood. But in this scenario, Poland and other likeminded EU countries that support a pragmatic vision of CSDP and seek added-value through EU-developed military capabilities may be forced out of the main vehicle of defence cooperation in Europe.

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Wither NATO?

Writing in the Water

Courtesy Stuart Rankin/Flickr. CC BY-NC 2.0

This article was published by Political Violence @ a Glance on 23 November 2016.

I have long been critical of those who think that NATO faces an existential crisis (see Wallace Thies for this debate). Much of this has been: what to do now that the main raison d’etre, the Soviet Union, is gone? The answer was very Keohane-ian – the institution was seen as too valuable for coordinating the security policies of the US, Canada, and most of Europe.

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union, NATO got involved in helping the countries of the former Warsaw Pact develop civilian control of the military (note that neither Hungary’s nor Poland’s march towards authoritarianism has involved the armed forces); try to and eventually manage the conflicts out of area (the former Yugoslavia); and fulfill the promise of Article V by helping to defend US airspace after 9/11 and then join the US in the Afghanistan effort. In much of this, there were moments of doubt – whether NATO would do what it was supposed to do. In these moments, countries kicked in enough effort regardless of how they felt about the actual operation because they wanted to preserve the alliance.

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Make Europe Defend Again?

Detail of St Thomas of Canterbury

Courtesy of Lawrence OP/Flickr. CC BY-NC 2.0

This article was originally published by the Carnegie Europe on 18 November 2016.

Donald Trump is making Europe think again, especially about European defense. Some European politicians are so concerned that the U.S. president-elect may scale back American military commitments in Europe that they are making radical proposals.

The foreign policy spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats, Roderich Kiesewetter, told Reuters on November 16, “The U.S. nuclear shield and nuclear security guarantees are imperative for Europe. . . . If the United States no longer wants to provide this guarantee, Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes.” He added that Germany could play an important role in convincing nuclear powers France and Britain to provide security guarantees for all of Europe.

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