Denying Terrorists Glory

Denying terrorists the glory. photo: Adam Tinworth/flickr

In the wake of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks on European and American soil governments felt the need to adapt their legislation to what was perceived as a new threat paradigm. Policymakers considered existing criminal laws as insufficient to combat terrorism. A contributing factor was that governments needed to be seen doing something about the threat. Enacting new laws is one of the things governments are very good at.

A large number of new laws have since then been enacted specially aimed at terrorism-related offenses. Examples include the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the UK, the US PATRIOT Act and various law amendments in Germany.

These special laws have been criticized on many accounts. Civil rights advocates disapprove of the sweeping powers some of these laws bestow upon authorities. The potential for abuse has been highlighted repeatedly. The main thrust of the argument has been that special laws for terrorism were not necessary, because killing people was a crime anyway, regardless of the ideology behind such acts.

While the process of radicalization is still poorly understood, it seems that adventure-seeking is an important part in the trajectory of many radicalized people. Terrorism, after all, is “exciting” business. That is the way it is depicted in jihadist videos and print publications with guns, explosives, and heroic battles against the West. This does not square with reality. An important number of uncovered plotters in the US and in Europe were amateurs and completely inept at their trade. They seemed to have little in common with their role models.

An unintended consequence of these aforementioned terrorism laws is that they give would-be terrorists a status which they clearly do not deserve. The label “terrorist” signals danger to society. In some circles this is seen as a badge of honor.

Connections Count

The spectre of homegrown attacks, photo: Josh Gross/flickr

America and Europe have experienced a string of terrorist attacks perpetrated by “homegrown” terrorists. But the term “homegrown” is often conflated with “independent”. There are in fact two types of homegrown terrorists: those with external support and guidance and those without. In recent years a clear pattern has emerged. Technically sophisticated attacks, such as the 7/7 attacks in London and the airline liquid explosives plot, have with almost no exception been carried out by terrorists who where homegrown, but had received substantial training and guidance from terrorist groups outside Europe, usually based in Pakistan. Terrorists who lacked the connections to established terror networks had to resort to more primitive methods such as shooting or stabbing.

This importance of hands-on training has been neglected in the hype surrounding “homegrown” terrorism. It turns out that it is more difficult than it was once believed to teach bomb making and other essential terrorist skills over the internet. One indication for this is that intelligence agencies still presume that there are only a limited number of proficient bomb makers within al-Qaida’s ranks.

The internet, however, does play a role in radicalization processes. In May 2010 British student Roshonara Choudhry tried to stab MP Stephen Timms for his support of the Iraq war. When interrogated by the police shortly after the crime, she said that video sermons by the radical preacher Anwar Al-Awlaki, who resides in Yemen, had prompted her to “punish” Timms. She had also consulted an Islamist website which had called on Muslims to “raise the knife of Jihad” against MPs who had voted for the Iraq war in 2003. There is no question that Choudhry was not radicalized solely by watching a couple of videos featuring Al-Awlaki, but it is reasonable to assume that these contributed to her decision to attack Timms.

Fighting for Moderation

Fighting for Moderation in Islam, photo: Asim Bharwani/flickr

Too often we associate moderation with the supposedly weaker qualities of leadership: compromise, pragmatism, process over substance. In the context of the theological and public relations battles fought over the essence of Islam in recent times, it is hard to disagree that the extremists have been most effective in promoting their brand of violent fundamentalism.

But the battle is not over. In fact, for the moderate majority, the secret weapon may have arrived. He is Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, the Islamic Shaykh and PhD holder who I was fortunate enough to hear speak recently at a US Institute of Peace event in Washington DC. He rose to prominence in March 2010 when he published his ‘Fatwa against Suicide Bombings and Terrorism’, though in fact his entire life has been one of public service and religious devotion – driven by a rigorous commitment to the peaceful tenets of his faith.

His resume is inspiring: Pakistan’s leading Islamic scholar with over 400 books published; a world renowned Islamic jurist and adviser to the Supreme Court of Pakistan; Chairman of the Board of Governors of Minhaj University in Lahore. Most consequential is his founding of Minhaj-ul-Quran International, whose educational branch has established over 570 schools and colleges in Pakistan, and whose humanitarian wing has sought to spread the message of peace around the world by building centers in more than 90 countries.

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From Pop Star to Jihadist?

Bali memorial, photo: crater/flickr

Now, this would certainly make for an unlikely path in life.

Rumours abound in Indonesia that jailed pop star Nasir “Ariel” Irham (jailed for his involvement in a sex scandal under the controversial 2008 anti-pornography law) has had contact with Abu Bakar Bashir, the notorious Indonesian jihadist and founding member of the notorious but increasingly weak Jemaah Islamiyah group, while in prison.

Although Bashir allegedly castigated the young man for his un-Islamic ways, the former heartthrob has reportedly been attending mass  prayer held my Bashir in prison and may have sought out advice from the radical cleric.

The fact that this information comes from Bashir’s personal assistant hardly makes it all that credible. The old man is probably just seeking some street cred among the increasingly non-Jemaah Islamiyah oriented young jihadists in Southeast Asia and ‘converting’ a young, ‘broken’ pop star to their cause might be good PR for the ailing demagogue.

Whatever the reality of the situation in this specific case, the story highlights some very important dilemmas: How a multicultural and tolerant Indonesia will deal with fundamentalist and religiously conservative pressures in the future and how young people, eager to embrace many aspects of more liberal western lifestyles (including pop stars), will deal with these pressures from below and above.

And perhaps more universally: How do you prevent and discourage radicalization in prisons, where psychological and physical conditions make young men particularly susceptible to a message that preaches power to those that are bound to feel powerless?

Our Digital Library offers a wealth of resources on the keywords psychology of terrorism and terrorism recruitment. Make sure to check out:

  • A USIP report on why young people join Al-Qaida
  • An RSIS commentary on the recruitment tactics of Indonesian jihadists
  • An RSIS paper examining the patterns of radicalization in Southeast Asia and the Jemaah Islamiyah group
  • An International Crisis Group briefing on the growing attractiveness of a jihadi narrative in the wake of the floods and worsening IDP crisis in Pakistan
  • An Elcano Royal Institute working paper on radicalization in the Muslim diaspora in Europe
  • A recent ISN Podcast on the Europeanization of jihad and the challenge this poses to counterradicalization efforts on the continent

Going Down the Afghan Road

Look familiar? Picture of a Yemeni refugee camp, courtesy of IRIN Photos/flickr

A new and worrying trend has taken hold in Yemen. According to a report by Amnesty International, the Yemeni government is increasingly sacrificing its human rights policies in order to preserve what they claim is their national security. Challenged by growing calls for secession in the south, periodic conflicts with the rebel Houthi movement in the north, and the regular appearance of al-Qaida throughout the country, the ruling elite is habitually resorting to repressive and illegal methods. An unknown number of Yemenis have disappeared; some have been tortured; and some have been condemned to death or long prison terms after unfair trials before specialized criminal courts. Under the guise of fighting terrorism, these measures actually only antagonized the Yemeni people, thereby preparing the ground for further extremism.

In part, the new Yemeni policies come as a reaction to intense pressure from governments in the US, Europe and the Gulf, which fear Yemen could break apart or even turn into a failed state. They especially dread the possibility of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) linking up with al-Shabab in Somalia, leaving the strategic Horn of Africa under the influence of Islamist militants and jeopardizing the safe transport of commodities to and from the Gulf and the Red Sea region. These external pressures, combined with domestic challenges to the legitimacy of the government, have prompted the Yemeni government to hit back with all the force it could muster.