This article was originally published by the East-West Center on 2 March 2017.
In light of the recent summit between President Trump and Prime Minister Abe and the latter’s fifth year in office, it is a good time to take stock of the recent changes to Japan’s security policy. While these changes lie within a broader continuum since the 1950s of gradually moving away from the post‐World War II constraints, the recent reforms are notable for two reasons: quantity — much has been enacted, amended, or established; and quality — these changes are systemic.
Over the past five years, Japan has redefined its national security strategy and reshaped its postwar system of pacifism, offering more options to respond to and proactively shape its own security environment. The government has built a justification for adopting collective self‐defense, developed a broad political consensus about the security challenges facing Japan, and implemented a series of executive decisions through the legislature and bureaucracy. These reforms are fundamentally reshaping how Japan communicates, thinks about, and implements national security policy by establishing a new institutional culture. These changes should not be valued so much for what they are now, but for their potential.
This article was originally published by IPI Global Observatory on 3 February 2017.
Within two weeks of taking power, new United States President Donald Trump has signed a number of executive orders that have caused alarm around the world. Perhaps the most controversial of these was an immigration ban that indefinitely suspended the entry and resettlement of Syrian refugees to the US and enacted a 90-day ban on travelers from six Muslim majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. While fears about Muslim immigration are widespread in the US and elsewhere, a significant body of research has failed to find justification for such policies. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that they might make the targeted problem of Islamic extremism much worse.
The Trump administration has justified the move as “preventive” and designed to reduce terror threats facing the US, yet the Cato Institute finds that not a single person (including refugees) from any of the Muslim-majority countries included has been involved in a terrorist attack in the US in the past 40 years. Data provided by the New America Foundation (since 9/11) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2005-2014) has, meanwhile, found that on a 10-year average, 11,737 Americans are likely to be killed from gun violence per year, compared with just two by Muslim jihadi immigrants.
This article was originally published by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) on 13 January 2017.
Recent developments herald a troubled year for the Afghans
During 2015 and 2016, the Taliban have been on an offensive and gained territory. Particularly they have made inroads into strategic areas where the Taliban can control the roads. At the same time, there is an active fight between the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Taliban over 20% of the Afghan territory. How the final battle will fall out is unknown, but if the ANSF loses, the Taliban can end up controlling up to one-third of the country.
The past couple of years have seen an increase in violent incidents, an increase in militant actors and in both the number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and Afghan returnees from the EU, Pakistan and Iran. The increase of violence is related both to the force used by insurgents and the Afghan government. The increase in militant actors is due to the military operation, known as the Zarb-e-Azb, launched by the Pakistani army in the tribal areas of Pakistan, which has pushed over new militants to Afghan soil, but also due to the entrance of the Islamic State into Afghanistan.
Courtesy of Pascal/Flickr
This article was originally published by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in December 2016.
The security and defence of of the European Union touches on a core area of national sovereignty. Lack of political will and mutual trust among EU member states has long been an obstacle to achieving the treaty objectives and has blocked the framing of a policy that could lead to a common defence. In recent years, defence budgets all over Europe have been slashed in an uncoordinated manner, hollowing out most member states’ capabilities. For this reason, the leaders of the EU member states meeting at the December 2013 European Council decided to buck the trend. But delivery has lagged behind.
Tapping into the political momentum generated by the fraught security climate in and around Europe, the prospect of Brexit and the unpredictability injected into US foreign policy by the election of Donald Trump, the European Council has now endorsed a ’winter package’ to strengthen the common security and defence policy of the Union. It has urged speedy implementation by institutions and member states alike.
This article was originally published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) on 20 December 2016.
Russia´s new Information Security Doctrine follows the line adopted in previous strategic documents whereby Russia is perceived as a besieged fortress. The doctrine identifies a number of external threats to Russia’s information space and calls for intensified monitoring of the Russian segment of the internet, Runet.
On 5 December 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed a new Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, replacing the Information Security Doctrine published in 2000. The Doctrine is one of the strategic planning documents and, as such, it expresses the official view about the management of national security in the information sphere. Rhetorically, the text resembles the National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2015, which signalled a heightened sense of threat towards Russia, and underlined the importance of maintaining strategic stability. Consequently, the spirit of the new Doctrine is sharper, almost bellicose in tone, and the threats are described in more concrete terms.
The information sphere is defined in a broader sense than in the previous doctrine. The key term in this regard is “informatization”, which refers to social, economic and technical processes for adopting and expanding information technology in society and the country as a whole, and for securing access to information resources. This change indicates recognition of the role of the information sphere in technological development but, most importantly, regards it as a tool to change the fabric of society. The Doctrine describes how this tool is used in the interests of Russia’s national security, and calls for an increased role for internet and information security management and the domestic production of information technology.