USS Bonhomme Sailors connect potable water to berthing and messing barge. Photo: Official U.S. Navy Page/flickr.
Because of a broadening of actors involved in water security, and decreases in irrigation demand in some areas, so-called ‘water wars’ will likely be avoided, though the failure of governments to provide basic municipal services in cities could be a source of conflict, said Ben Crow, professor and department chair of sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
“It’s quite possible that the failure of governments to provide access to water and sanitation, and, more broadly, to the rights of city living, could be a cause of instability and lack of government legitimacy,” he said.
Syrians hold photos of Assad and Putin during a pro-regime protest in front of the Russian embassy in Damascus, Syria, 2012. Photo: Freedom House/flickr.
This post originally appeared on the World blogat Blouin Global News.
Russia has been Bashar al-Assad’s staunchest protector. Although the British parliament’s decision not to intervene militarily in Syria has disappointed Washington, as of writing it seems unlikely to affect its resolution to strike against the Assad’s regime. When it does so, it will inevitably anger Moscow and further contribute to its belief that the United States seeks to be a “monopolar” power that acts however it wants on the world stage.
But why has Moscow been so stalwart in its support of an undeniably odious regime? It is possible to talk glibly of a natural affinity between autocrats (although Vladimir Putin clearly still commands the support of a clear majority of Russians) or a fear of some global swing against authoritarian regimes (though there are many dominos between Damascus and Moscow that would fall first), the answer is a mix of pragmatism, fear and geopolitics.
Protests in Bahrain in 2011. Photo: Al Jazeera English/Flickr.
Since independence, relations between citizens and their states in the Gulf have been shaped in part by the oil and gas wealth that these countries enjoy. Control over oil and gas revenues allows the governments to offer extensive benefits to citizens, while hardly needing to extract any taxes. This system, often described as a rentier state, means that while the state is absolved from the usual need to obtain income from its citizens, they in turn have less of a stake in demanding transparency, accountability and so on, or so the argument goes. Meanwhile, others in the Gulf see their state benefits as evidence of the magnanimity of paternalistic rulers.
The arguments between those who see dissidents as mere ingrates, and those who see conservatives as regime stooges, have been growing more polarized. The resulting political tensions are visible above all in Bahrain, where renewed protests are being met with an intensive crackdown today; and in the UAE, over the recent sentencing of opposition activists, and to some extent also in Kuwait. But either way, the fact remains that this economic model is not sustainable in the long term.
Two Afghan truck drivers stack bags of grain in Shorabak, Afghanistan. Photo: JBLM PAO/flickr.
The economic security of individuals and households is a major challenge for development interventions in conflict-affected countries. Once the conflict is over and humanitarian aid leaves, how do you feed people, secure livelihoods and improve markets and market access? An important finding from a major EU-funded research program on conflict analysis is that the answer to this question is closely linked to processes of institutional change that take place during violent conflict.
As the research conducted thus far as part of the MICROCON project illustrates, violent conflicts kill and destroy. However, conflict-affected countries are also characterized by intense institutional change that needs to be better understood. Institutional change takes place when different actors contest and sometimes win over former state institutions, transforming social, economic and political structures, organizations and norms.
Parliament House in Canberra, Australia. Photo: JJ Harrison/Wikimedia Commons.
When the United Kingdom (UK) sought to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1970s, it stirred a backlash in Australia. Because its prime exporters enjoyed easy access to the large British market, many feared a possible collapse would occur in bilateral trade. Today, the debate over whether the UK should remain in the EU attracts few headlines in Australia. It is not a replay of the previous EEC debate. Nevertheless, a British “no” vote in the 2017 referendum could yet again have negative consequences for the economic relationship between the two countries. This time, however, Australia wants the UK to stay in the grand ‘European Project’ rather than to stay out.
Much has clearly changed since the 1970s. Back then, Western Europe’s Common Customs Tariff and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represented substantial trade barriers for Australia’s major exporters. When the UK finally did join the EEC, Canberra not only lost its preferential access to an alternative export market, it also deepened its rift with Brussels. In the years that followed, Australia-EU relations therefore continued to suffer from ongoing trade disputes, several of which ended in international legal proceedings.
